A workplace agent is accountable only when a verifiable owner mandate defines who authorized it, what it may do, and when that authority ends.
The displayed public key verifies the ECDSA signature over a canonical mandate. Any change to the owner, agent, scope, or expiry invalidates that proof.
A named owner is not enough. The signer must control the private key paired with the public verification key.
The accountable party remains explicit even when an agent works for hours without supervision.
Scopes convert “act for me” into a reviewable boundary. Anything outside the list is unauthorized.
The sample mandate lists four scopes: file read, document write, calendar read, and web research. It also lists two human-approval categories, external send and financial action. At sixty pixels per declared list item the bars span two hundred forty and one hundred twenty. These strings describe authority boundaries, but the page does not enforce them on external systems. It generates a fresh demonstration ECDSA key pair locally and signs the sample. The signed owner identifier is only a claim inside those bytes; trusting a self-generated public key does not verify that named person authorized the agent. The verify function combines three Boolean gates: schema validation, signature verification, and expiry. All three must pass. At eighty pixels per gate the written-gate bar spans two hundred forty. In this offline copy the schema library is absent, so verification cannot complete and the completed-gate bar is zero. The initial ready label is static and scope rendering only proves the local signing initialization finished. No valid delegation or downloadable verification evidence is claimed. The source does not require issued-at to precede the current time and does not establish trust in the owner identity. The mandate declares a maximum runtime of one hundred twenty minutes, drawn at two pixels per declared minute as a two hundred forty pixel bar. The page creates no timer enforcing that cap, so the second bar for enforcement timers remains zero. It signs UTF-eight bytes from JSON stringify with a generated P two fifty six key and SHA two fifty six. Changing those bytes would invalidate that signature, but this is not a general canonical-JSON protocol or proof of biological humanity. There is no external identity API call or actual agent execution. A trusted issuer and operational permission enforcement remain separate requirements.