Understand the connection boundary
MCP supplies a way for an application to expose tools and resources to an AI client. The social platform still controls account access and supported actions. A server that advertises a publish tool does not itself establish that the person asking for publication owns the account or approved the content.
Map the chain: user, AI client, tool server, platform authorization and target account. Record which party holds credentials and which party can revoke access. Do not place raw tokens in prompts, browser-visible settings or exported operational briefs.
Authorize a concrete action
A useful publishing request binds the account, asset version, caption, destination and timing. If an agent changes one of those after approval, decide whether the changed action remains within the authorization. The answer should follow the user’s actual scope, not a blanket assumption that every write is acceptable.
The MCP security guidance covers risks including token passthrough and confused-deputy behavior. Its consent and authorization boundaries matter when a server sits between a model and a third-party service. A connected credential must not silently authorize unrelated spending or another provider.
Keep untrusted content out of the control channel
Comments, webpages, captions and tool results can contain instructions written by someone else. Treat them as content to inspect, not new authority to change accounts, export private information or alter a campaign. A model should report relevant content without allowing that content to rewrite the task.
Use a draft-and-review workflow where the work warrants review, especially claims, rights, sensitive replies and brand voice. For routine actions already authorized, preserve the established scope instead of asking for the same approval repeatedly. The practical boundary is what the user permitted and what changed.
Model the whole publishing lifecycle
Represent drafted, approved, submitted, processing, live, failed and cancelled states separately. Keep the tool request ID and platform receipt. A network timeout after submission is an ambiguous outcome; inspect the known job and account before retrying. Attach the live URL to the exact approved version.
A browser or device agent adds interface dependencies. A proxy changes routing; Browserless or another hosted browser changes where a web session executes; a native device changes the interface available. None removes platform authorization or makes actions reliable by definition. Test interruption, reconnection and cancellation.
Build a useful agent contract
Specify the work the agent may do, the changes requiring renewed review, the data it may read, the credential owner and the evidence needed for completion. Give failures a named escalation owner. Require honest status: drafted is not published, and posted is not evidence of business impact.
The builder produces a readable operating contract from your selections. It does not configure an MCP server, connect an account or enforce permissions. Apply the resulting contract in the actual client and server, then verify it with a representative allowed action and a deliberately out-of-scope request.