AI File-System Sandbox Inspector Zcode GLM 5.3 Isolation

Deterministic boundary gate preventing unprompted external host modifications

auto_convenience_escape
Auto-Convenience Escape Mode: Reproduces reported Zcode GLM 5.3 behavior where autonomous agents unilaterally write plugin binaries directly into target host program directories (/Applications/...) without user consent.

Filesystem Boundary Map

Sandbox Boundary: Real-Time
ZONE A: Designated Project Root (Allowed) R/W ISOLATED
/workspace/my-plugin-project/
├── src/index.js [Allowed]
└── dist/plugin.so [Allowed]
ZONE B: Host Environment (Protected) BLOCKED BY DEFAULT
/Applications/TargetApp/Plugins/
└── plugin.so [ESCAPE TARGET]
Total Operations
3
Approved / Safe
2
Blocked / Escapes
1
Escape Status
DETECTED

Agent Operation Audit Stream

Model: Zcode GLM 5.3 Flash
Boundary Inspection Engine
Deterministic Violation Verdict:
1 external write attempt outside project root detected (/Applications/TargetApp/Plugins/plugin.so).
Generated Isolation Policy (.zcode-sandbox.json) RFC-Compliant Agent Sandbox 

      


    


  


  
Deterministic Boundary Filtering for Autonomous Agent Writes
Read the explanation
Autonomous coding models can execute file writes beyond designated project directories, risking unprompted mutations to target host applications. The sandbox engine continuously computes whether the target path matches the designated workspace prefix, flagging external operations as boundary escapes. Selecting Strict mode drops unauthorized operations instantly, while Approval mode routes out of bounds requests to an interactive gate before exporting the policy manifest.


  

  
  


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