CSAIL-LAB

Transient CPU Gap Exploit Simulator

Intel Skylake / AMD Zen2 Model | CYCLES: 0
Out-of-Order Instruction Pipeline & Reorder Buffer (ROB) READY
1. IF (Fetch)IDLE
NOP
PC: 0x7FFF0400
2. ID (Decode)IDLE
NOP
uOp Decoder
3. ROB AllocationIDLE
Empty
Entry #42
4. Out-of-Order ALUIDLE
Standby
Branch Pred: TAKEN
5. LSU (Mem Load)IDLE
Cache Line L1
D-Cache Hit/Miss
6. Commit/SquashCLEAN
In-Order Valid
Architectural Gate
ARCHITECTURAL STATE (Reversible) CLEAN / SQUASHED

Processor register file visible to software. Rolls back immediately when the branch resolution hardware confirms misprediction.

R1 (User Idx) 0x000000FF
R2 (Secret Byte) 0x00000000
R3 (Probe Target) 0x00000000
Status: Register state preserved cleanly (No fault thrown)
MICROARCHITECTURAL STATE (Persistent Leaks) PERSISTS

Hardware execution artifacts (L1/L2 Cache, TLB, Branch Predictor buffers). Never reverted upon misprediction rollback!

Polluted Cache Set Line #05 (0x53)
Transient Lifetime 14 Clocks
Branch Squash Gap EXPLOITED
Cache Footprint: Probe Array line warmed during speculative window
Flush+Reload Timing Histogram (Cycles / Cache Set) Hit: < 90 cycles | Miss (DRAM): > 180 cycles
CACHE HIT THRESHOLD (90 CYCLES)
PROBED CACHE SETS 16 / 16
MIN LATENCY (HIT) --
MAX LATENCY (MISS) --
EXTRACTED SECRET --
RECOVERED KERNEL SECRET: 0x53 ('S') SIDE-CHANNEL EXPLOITED
Confidence: 99.8% (Signal-to-Noise: 4.8x)
Why Modern Microarchitectures Leak During Squashes

In modern speculative execution CPUs (such as Intel Core/Xeon and AMD Zen architectures), branch predictors anticipate control flow decisions to eliminate memory pipeline bubbles. When a branch instruction depends on an uncached boundary check, the processor continues executing subsequent instructions speculatively in the transient execution window.

Although the architectural state (general-purpose registers like R1, R2, R3) is cleanly squashed and rolled back when the misprediction is resolved, the microarchitectural state (the CPU cache hierarchy) is not rolled back because flushing cache lines on every squash would introduce crippling performance penalties. By timing how long memory loads take across an attacker-controlled probe array using high-resolution hardware timers (rdtsc), the attacker recovers sensitive data byte-by-byte.

Research Citation: MIT CSAIL Computer Science & Artificial Intelligence Laboratory — Speculative Hardware Vulnerability Disclosures & Transient Execution Attack Models on Intel and AMD Microarchitectures.
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