Scenarios & Interventions
Capital & Governance Inputs
Retail Retirement Capital
$15,000B
Pensions, 401(k)s & retail index deposits flowing into passive funds.
Proxy Delegation Rate
98.5%
% of retail investors surrendering voting rights to the fund manager.
Cross-Holding Intensity
0.85
Degree to which managers hold stock in each other & form unified voting blocs.
Manager Market Share Allocation
VANGUARD
42%
BLACKROCK
38%
FIDELITY
20%
Relative share normalized to 100% of institutional flow.
Source Thesis Grounding
"The average person releases voting rights to mutual funds... those funds buy each other’s stock... board members of three companies make final decisions for thousands of public firms." — r/financestudents
Deterministic Governance Proof
Voting Concentration
82.4%
Big Three voting bloc control
Uncontested Board Seats
94.2%
Slates backed by institutional block
Retail Say Index
0.01
Effective individual leverage (0-1.0)
Cross-Ownership Links
9
Reinforcing institutional loops
Simulated Boardroom Ledger
| Retail Inflow Pool | $15,000B |
| Vanguard Voting Stake | $6,300B (42%) |
| BlackRock Voting Stake | $5,700B (38%) |
| Fidelity Voting Stake | $3,000B (20%) |
| Institutional Bloc Dominance | HEGEMONIC |
| Dissenting Threshold Needed | > 51.0% Outflow |
Structural Dynamics
Under current 98.5% proxy delegation and 0.85 cross-holding intensity, retail capital guarantees an 82.4% consolidated institutional voting block. Corporate boards face 94.2% uncontested elections due to mutual shareholding alignment.
Academic Context: Modeled on institutional investor ownership studies (Bebchuk, Hirst & Fich, 2020-2024; Coates, The Problem of Twelve). Simulation updates deterministically with no external API dependency.