Measure identifier reuse and relay concentration in a trace. Do not mistake a sample for the live network.
Anonymize aliases first. One row per relay hop; monitored is 0 or 1 and must be consistent per alias.
Ready for an anonymized hop trace.
Group payment hops, inspect repeated hashes, and calculate how often dominant or user-labeled relays touch this sample.
This audits supplied rows only. It does not map the live network, identify entities, run an attack, prove deanonymization, or verify source-wide percentages.
A relay's coverage is the fraction of distinct payments it appears in. Top-two coverage is the union of those payment sets. Gini summarizes uneven hop appearances, while monitored exposure uses only labels you supplied.
Changing every per-hop hash leaves those topology numbers intact but changes hash-reuse classification from six routes to zero. That is why the audit keeps metadata and concentration evidence separate.
No. It is a correlation surface in the supplied trace, not a complete deanonymization result. Identity attribution and attack feasibility require additional evidence the tool does not have.
No. It describes six fixture payments only. A global conclusion requires a representative, dated network snapshot, clear sampling, and an independently reviewed method.
No. Onion routing can hide the full path from a single relay while repeated identifiers and recurrent relays remain separate observable properties. The tool measures only properties present in the input.