ICS/OT DEFENSE

Water SCADA Defense Lab: Siemens S7 Hardening

PROCESS MIMIC: CLEARWATER MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY (12 MGD) NOMINAL FLOW
PUMP 101 RUNNING NaOCl TANK DOSER: 1.4 ppm P-102 SAND FILTER 1 DIFF: 0.18 NTU VALVE: AUTO CLEARWELL 72% DIST PUMP 65 PSI SIEMENS S7-1200 / 1500 S7comm Port 102 | RUN MODE
Free Chlorine
1.4 ppm
EPA Compliant (0.2-4.0)
Turbidity
0.18 NTU
Nominal (<0.30)
Line Pressure
65 PSI
Stable (50-80)
Clearwell Level
72%
Balanced
PURDUE MODEL OT NETWORK TOPOLOGY (LEVELS 0 - 4) UNSEGMENTED OT/IT
LEVEL 4/5
Internet Gateway / WAN Enterprise Billing & Office IT
LEVEL 3.5
No DMZ (Direct Bridged Routing)
LEVEL 3/2
SCADA Central HMI Engineering Workstation (TIA Portal)
LEVEL 1
Siemens S7-1200 (Chemical Feed) Siemens S7-1500 (High-Service Pumps)
LEVEL 0
NaOCl Dosing Pump Actuator Sand Filter Pneumatic Actuator Pressure Sensor 4-20mA
THREAT INJECTION CONSOLE ADVERSARY PLAYBOOK
CISA / EPA DEFENSE HARDENING RACK CPG: 0%
Purdue OT DMZ Firewall
Block WAN access to Port 102 / S7
S7comm-plus Cryptographic Auth
Require integrity HMAC on PLC commands
Decommission Cellular Modem
Remove backdoor cellular remote access
Enforce MFA & Disable Web UI
Harden TIA Portal & turn off PLC HTTP
OT Deep Packet Inspection IDS
Snort/Suricata rules for unauthorized S7 writes
INCIDENT & ATT&CK FOR ICS AUDIT LOG
[INIT] Clearwater Municipal Water SCADA Simulator online. S7 PLC Firmware v4.2.
[ADVISORY] US CISA/EPA: Nation-state actors targeting internet-exposed Siemens controllers.
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