Zero-Knowledge AI Privacy Architecture Auditor
Verify claims like "Nobody, including the provider, can have access to your data". Simulate cryptographic attestations, Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), on-device SLMs, and metadata leakage across smart wearables and personal AI assistants.
Live Inference Topology
E2E Enclave Channel ActiveUnderstanding "Zero-Access" AI Claims
When tech leaders state that "nobody, including ourselves, can have access to your data", this claim cannot be verified solely through privacy policies or legal terms of service. Genuine zero-access architectures require confidential computing: hardware-enforced memory isolation where CPU/GPU memory is encrypted on the silicon bus, preventing even hypervisors, cloud operators, root administrators, or court subpoenas from reading RAM contents.
However, confidential compute is only as strong as its Remote Attestation. If the client wearable does not verify an unforgeable cryptographic silicon quote before sending the key, the host provider could silently route traffic to standard unencrypted GPUs.
Architectural Vulnerabilities to Check
Side-Channel & Packet Size Analysis
Even if prompt text is encrypted, token-by-token streaming timing and response packet sizes can reveal the identity of words or medical topics via traffic fingerprinting unless padded with constant-rate dummy frames.
Remote Attestation vs. Marketing Trust
Without client-verified hardware quotes signed by silicon vendor root keys (AMD, Intel, NVIDIA), a cloud service can claim enclave isolation while running standard debugging and logging configurations.
Telemetry and Diagnostic Crash Dumps
If an assistant crashes during inference, un-sanitized core dumps sent to developer telemetry servers can accidentally persist raw prompt strings in cleartext storage.