Unsigned authority check

Policy before payment.

Validate machine identity and treasury constraints, then test a payment batch before any wallet or transaction layer.

Local evidence only. No wallet is created, no request is signed, and no funds or live x402/DeFi services are touched.
Waiting for Ajv.
hard gates: emergency stop → chain → recipient → per-tx → daily
review gate: amount > 20 USDC
No batch evaluated.
Schema—
Allow—
Review—
Deny—

Row decisions

Load the validated sample.

Requested USDC by outcome

Understanding Pre-Flight Agent Treasury Policy Verification

How does pre-execution schema and policy validation filter autonomous payment requests before signing or broadcasting transactions?

Autonomous AI agents interacting with financial contracts require programmatic guardrails before transactions ever touch a private key or signing RPC. The Agent Treasury Gate illustrates pre-flight validation: it first validates the configuration structure using JSON Schema (via Ajv), and then evaluates candidate payments sequentially against hard deterministic rules (emergency circuit breakers, chain whitelists, recipient address lists, per-transaction maximums, and cumulative daily limits) alongside advisory manual-review thresholds.

This demonstration runs entirely in-memory using static fixtures without real cryptographic keys, signatures, blockchain connections, or dynamic budget state tracking across sessions. In production systems, policy checks must be coupled with hardware enclave signing, multi-party computation (MPC), atomic smart contract spend limits, or verifiable proofs to prevent bypass between evaluation and broadcast.

Try a worked example

Click 'Load policy + batch' to compile the policy schema in Ajv and verify the nine required controls. Next, click 'Evaluate unsigned payments': the demo evaluates four fixture requests (P1 for 12 USDC, P2 for 22 USDC, P3 for 8 USDC, and P4 for 70 USDC). P1 passes directly (ALLOW); P2 triggers the human review threshold (>20 USDC, REVIEW); P3 is blocked because 'storage.vendor' is not on the recipient whitelist (DENY); and P4 is blocked because it exceeds the 25 USDC per-transaction cap (DENY). The summary cards update to show 1 ALLOW, 1 REVIEW, and 2 DENY.

Separation of Policy Verification and Key Execution

In autonomous agent architectures, allowing an agent unrestricted access to private transaction keys introduces high operational risk. A treasury gate acts as an unsigned pre-execution boundary, ensuring every outgoing instruction satisfies structural and financial constraints before reaching the signing enclave.

The sequential evaluation pattern ensures that fatal errors—such as inactive chain targets, non-allowlisted counterparties, or emergency halts—abort immediately, reserving manual review queues strictly for legitimate but high-value operations.

Cumulative Limit Tracking and State Drift

A key challenge in client-side or off-chain pre-flight gates is concurrency. If multiple agent instances run concurrently, local daily limit counters can drift out of sync with actual chain balances unless backed by an on-chain ledger or consensus-backed coordinator.

Unsigned policy evidence does not spend treasury funds

Read the explanation

The four unsigned sample requests ask for twelve, twenty-two, eight and seventy USDC. Twelve passes. Twenty-two is within the twenty-five per-transaction cap but above the strict twenty review threshold, so it needs review. Eight targets an unlisted recipient and is denied. Seventy exceeds the per-transaction cap and is denied. The checks short circuit through emergency stop, chain, recipient, single payment and daily budget before review. The running amount includes both ALLOW and REVIEW rows, reserving thirty-four USDC, even though the twenty-two request is not approved for execution. Denied rows do not add to it. Total requested amount is one hundred twelve USDC. The outcome chart groups twelve allowed, twenty-two under review and seventy-eight denied. These are local requested amounts, not funds paid or settled. Ajv validates nine required policy fields and rejects additional properties. A DID prefix pattern is a syntax check, not proof of account ownership. The audit sink is a string and is not contacted. The page explicitly creates no wallet, signs no request and touches no live payment service. Export contains the policy, requests and local decisions. In the offline preview the external Ajv import is blocked and its native load button stays disabled; no forced evaluation is performed.

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