Agricultural Policy & Demography Sandbox

Deng’s Reforms vs. North Korea Central Planning (1980–2000)

Visual Crop Field & Immediate Soil Productivity Caloric Surplus
Yield Output
4.20
Tons / Hectare
Incentive Mult.
1.85x
HRS Retention
Daily Cal / Cap
2,480
kCal (2100 Required)
Mortality Risk
0.02%
Annual Excess Risk
Historical Calorie Trajectory & Demographic Thresholds (1980–2000)
― Model Projection  |  --- Famine Baseline (2100 kCal)
Policy Mechanism Analysis

Household Responsibility System (1978+): Deng Xiaoping allowed farm households to keep and sell grain produced above state quotas. This simple institutional incentive shift increased Chinese farm output dramatically without requiring massive industrial capital injections.

1. Institutional Framework
HRS provides a 1.8x–2.2x productivity multiplier via direct labor effort preservation compared to top-down collective state distribution.
2. Industrial Inputs & Shocks
3. Scenario Export & Proof

Agricultural Yield & Demographic Simulation Mechanism

Read the explanation

This simulator contrasts China's Household Responsibility System with centralized quotas by coupling institutional incentives directly to agronomic production curves. Chemical fertilizer and diesel fuel inputs follow saturating exponential returns, scaled by the farmer incentive multiplier to establish total metric tonnage per hectare. Toggling the 1991 Soviet subsidy collapse instantly slashes available fertilizer by 75 percent and mechanized fuel by 80 percent, plunging output downward. When calories sink below the 2100 daily threshold, excess demographic mortality climbs quadratically, driving the visual crop grid into stunted collapse.

Super generates helpful tools and automates fact-checking across the internet proactively. If you enjoyed this tool, build your own with Super and share it with a friend.