Antitrust Clearance & HHI Remedy Modeler

Simulate corporate mega-mergers, calculate market concentration (pre/post HHI & ΔHHI), stress-test regulatory scrutiny under FTC/DOJ Guidelines, and design state AG remedy concessions to clear deal thresholds.

Industry Benchmark Presets:

Market Configuration Total: 100%

Acquiring Entity (Firm A)

Target Entity (Firm B)

Competitor Market Shares (%)

Remedies & Divestitures Antitrust Settlement

Structural Divestiture Carve-out: 0.0%

Assets sold off to an independent third-party competitor to reduce combined entity market share.

State Attorneys General Concessions

Price Freeze & Carriage Commitment 3-year rate moratorium and mandated non-discriminatory access.

Local Production & Employment Protection Binding pledges to state AGs preventing studio closure or mass layoffs.

Information Firewalls & Independent Monitor Court-appointed compliance trustee to prevent competitive coordination.

State Consumer Restitution Fund Direct settlement cash escrow funding regional public access programs.

Pre-Merger HHI 1,820 Moderately Concentrated

Post-Merger HHI 2,450 Highly Concentrated

Δ HHI Increase +630 > 100 pt Presumption

Combined Firm Share

Market Share Structure: Pre-Merger vs. Post-Remedy

Dynamic Vector Canvas

FTC / DOJ 2023 Merger Guidelines Test

Under Guideline 1, a post-merger HHI above 1,800 points with an increase (ΔHHI) over 100 points produces a legal presumption of substantially lessened competition.

State AG Settlement Adequacy

2 of 4 key state commitments pledged. Multi-state antitrust litigation risk significantly reduced via structural divestiture and pricing moratoria.

Model calculated: All state AG concessions and HHI indices synchronized.

Antitrust Law & HHI Economics Primer

How federal agencies (FTC/DOJ) and State Attorneys General assess anti-competitive harm, market power, and remedy settlements.

What is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)?

HHI is calculated by summing the squares of individual market shares for all firms in the relevant antitrust market (e.g., 30² + 20² + ...). Markets with HHI below 1,000 are unconcentrated; 1,000 to 1,800 are moderately concentrated; and above 1,800 are highly concentrated.

What triggers an FTC/DOJ Challenge?

Mergers in highly concentrated markets producing a ΔHHI greater than 100 points, or combinations creating an entity with >30% market share, trigger a rebuttable presumption that the merger may substantially lessen competition under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.

Why do State Attorneys General Settle Separately?

Even if federal regulators approve or negotiate a consent decree, state AGs possess independent parens patriae standing to block transactions that harm local consumers, workers, or regional production. Merging parties frequently settle state lawsuits through specific localized conduct remedies.

Structural Divestitures vs. Conduct Remedies

Antitrust enforcers strongly favor clean structural divestitures (selling business units to viable independent competitors) over conduct promises (such as behavioral pricing caps), because structural fixes immediately restore competitive tension without requiring perpetual judicial oversight.